

# Statecraft at the Crossroads: A New Diplomacy

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*The severe global economic contraction that began in 2008 accelerates the transition to a new age of international politics, one characterized by weak but reassertive states, rising powers, waning American primacy, shifting media ecology, and aroused and empowered societies. This new age of political ferment requires a dramatic reassessment of the way the United States formulates and conducts its national security strategy. This article explores the nexus between our foreign policy and politics across domestic and foreign boundaries on several key national security challenges. It recommends a new diplomacy employing public diplomats deeply attuned to the cultural and political particularities of human plurality in the global public square.*

## Shredding Illusions

In the midst of the 2008 financial collapse, the portrait painted by scholars of globalization of a flattened world of markets, cosmopolitan civil society, and a fluid multitude of networked transnational actors (for good and ill), has dissolved to reveal *pentimenti* of nation-states. Called to the foreground by citizens who want just, empowered, and effective governments that reflect their cultural-political identities, states are attempting to restore stability and provide the security and prosperity that their citizens believe is the obligation of sovereignty.<sup>1</sup> The contraction of the global market, and subsequent state efforts to stimulate recovery and reign in market excesses through greater oversight and regulation, have reenergized national politics and nationalist impulses everywhere, moving nation-states center stage once again.

The financial contraction that began in 2008 also exposed deeper cracks in the international system than we had assumed existed. Nuclear proliferation, militant extremism, environmental disasters, pandemics, energy depletion, and resource scarcity dissolve boundaries and threaten

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international order at a time when the international architecture binding us in common purpose appears increasingly brittle. “Many of the institutions at the heart of the internationalist project—The United Nations (UN), the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the World Trade Organization (WTO)—are not working as envisioned,” writes political scientist Jeffery Legro.<sup>2</sup> The unprecedented destruction of global wealth over the past year, and the domestic economic problems that result, make it improbable that states will soon find the funds or political will to revitalize international institutions or create new ones to manage the complex, unpredictable, and interconnected problems that increasingly defy our efforts at control.

The image of the United States of America illuminated by the searing economic collapse that began in its own financial capital, has highlighted surprising systemic weaknesses in the core area long thought to be the foundation of U.S. strength, and raised questions about the effect that America’s economic meltdown would have on its international leadership as well. Diminished economic assets now compound the “wasting” military assets and the loss in global standing that has resulted from eight years of war, all with the effect of eroding American power.<sup>3</sup> National intelligence analysts quickly recognized that, as a consequence, the “unprecedented shift in relative wealth and economic power roughly from West to East,” would be accelerated, even though they insist that the United States still remains the most powerful single player in a rebalancing world.<sup>4</sup>

Although the United States may not have a competitor at the top of the power pyramid, it is no longer the dominant hub around which the world is centered. The U.S. may still have considerable leverage to persuade and influence in the political realm. But without the resources to coerce and induce cooperation, scholars like Professor Legro anticipate that it will need to cut “deals to establish order that will require more and greater concessions on the part of traditional U.S. interests.”<sup>5</sup> Given the existing fragmentation of American political consensus on national security issues, this could trigger deep domestic political dissension, making some national security strategies unsustainable. The United States now has no choice but to consider the “promise of politics” both within states—including its own—and between states, at the media saturated crossroads of international life.<sup>6</sup> For the United States to operate effectively on the shifting ground of the global landscape, it needs better alignment between its instruments of statecraft and the work to be done. It needs a new diplomacy grounded in the reality of our plural existence, where the stakes are high and passions and perspectives clash.

### **Shifting Power Centers**

As the global crossroads pulse with transnational insurgents, international traders, travelers, and migrants of all sorts—both builders and destroyers of community—the nationalism that has accompanied the rising power of the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India and China), Turkey, Iran, and other emerging powers, all of which crave respect and recognition on the world stage, will not diminish.<sup>7</sup> Weak powers, in particular, are sensitive to any—even minor—

infringements of their sovereign rights. As political philosopher Michael Waltzer contends, their people's pride demands a recognized place in the society of nation states.<sup>8</sup> This pride and demand for respect is a major factor in crafting national security strategies with respect to weaker states like Mexico, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. Among stronger states like China, and reemergent great powers like Russia, considerations of pride and respect are essential.

According to Peter Katzenstein and Robert Keohane, for example, "Chinese elites and public are highly nationalistic and very sensitive to threats to Chinese sovereignty."<sup>9</sup> Currently there is increasing nationalist pressure to "leave the dollar behind" and use Chinese economic power to create a new international reserve currency. Young Chinese, in particular, want to reinforce the position of China as a great power. A Shanghai academic who was interviewed by reporter Joshua Kurlantzick admits, "they think the Chinese leadership is too weak, and should be harder on the U.S."<sup>10</sup> This idea of leaving the dollar behind and switching some of the BRIC's three trillion dollar currency reserves into IMF bonds was carried into the first ever BRIC Summit in June 2009. While perhaps not the new "epicenter of world politics" that Russia's President Medvedev claimed, the very fact of the BRIC Summit reflects the growing political confidence of the newly pivotal powers as they attempt to leverage their strengthened economic capacity relative to the West.<sup>11</sup> And, although the interests and values of rising states hardly align across the board, as Chinese and Indian positions on Sri Lanka demonstrate, the capacity of China and Iran to give nearly three billion dollars in military and economic assistance to the Sri Lankan government allowed that state to stiff the West and take a pass on human rights in finally crushing the Tamil insurgency in the spring of 2009.<sup>12</sup>

As the international system rebalances away from the West and in the direction of rising eastern powers whose national wounds are still raw, state sovereignty has regained some of the importance lost earlier when western-based NGOs, riding on the power of western liberal democracies, advanced the "responsibility to protect" as a universal norm. The consequences play out in Darfur. Human rights groups backed by western powers sought and won an indictment and subsequent arrest warrant from the International Criminal Court for Sudan's President Omar Hassan al-Bashir for crimes against humanity.<sup>13</sup> This legalistic strategy inflamed Sudanese sovereignty, resulted in the expulsion of international humanitarian groups, and pitted the Arab League and the African Union against the West, charging imperialism, racism, and religious bias.<sup>14</sup> Supported by China, Russia, Iran, and even Turkey on the basis of the "non-intervention" principle, Bashir now seems less at risk than the Darfuris, who still remain in dire straits. Claims of impartial activism based on moral, legalistic principles do not lift transnational human rights groups above the fray of world politics. The promotion of human rights remains a deeply political and contentious struggle, blurring the lines between morality and power.

To engage this issue, President Obama named retired Air Force General Scott Gration as his special envoy to the Sudan. Then with some irony,

and revealing an ultimate faith in state power rather than international law, Jerry Fowler, president of the Save Darfur Coalition, told Reuters, “We will be looking to see if he has the mandate and the authority to drive U.S. policy on Sudan.”<sup>15</sup> Gration, first welcomed by advocacy groups but now criticized for his conciliatory stance, is engaged in quiet diplomatic negotiations that may result in some relief for the Darfuris. Still, the relative decline in American power has had a negative impact on the effectiveness of non-governmental activist organizations rooted in the United States when their strategies seek to enlist American leverage in order to achieve their objectives.<sup>16</sup> Acting on the “responsibility to protect” will become more difficult as power shifts from West to East, and rising nationalism complicates the trade-offs that western liberal democracies must make. International politics, in the words of theologian Reinhold Niebuhr, is a theater in which “conscience and power meet, where ethical and coercive factors of human life will interpenetrate and work out their uneasy compromises.”<sup>17</sup>

Today, while the economic influence of the EU is challenged externally by a rising East, the very concept of the EU is challenged internally by the renewed economic nationalism of its member states. In the lowest voter turnout ever in June 2009, Europeans shifted the spectrum of the EU Parliament so far to the right that even a few anti-European Union, anti-immigrant nativists were elected to represent member states. As national societies question whether their governments are competent to restore stability and provide security and prosperity, governments are pulled inward in response. As German Chancellor Merkel put it, “international policy is, for all the friendship and commonality, always also about representing the interests of one’s own country.”<sup>18</sup> Despite the efforts of the G20 and international organizations like the WTO and the IMF to co-ordinate a response to the global economic crisis, the risk of domestic political instability has led to a wave of trade protectionism, as governments attempt to cushion their citizens from the impact of recession and stimulate economic recovery.

The new realities of the international system are reflected in the very expansion of the G8 to a more inclusive G20 as a key locus of political bargaining and deliberation on economic issues. The inclusion of newly pivotal powers in international fora does not just add a few more talking heads to the old club. It brings to the table representatives of societies with cultural norms divergent from those in the West and is, therefore, potentially transformative. President Obama addressed the complexity in his first trip abroad as president: “If there’s just Roosevelt and Churchill sitting in a room with a brandy, that’s an easier negotiation. But that’s not the world we live in, and it shouldn’t be the world that we live in.”<sup>19</sup> With moral clarity, President Obama both reads and welcomes the new international terrain, seeing in it an opportunity to advance American ideals and objectives through the empowerment of other countries and the embrace of pluralism on the international stage. Such leadership is essential. But, for the United States to operate effectively on the shifting ground of the global landscape, as the candidate Obama said, “It’s time to make diplomacy a top priority. Instead of shuttering consulates, we need to open them in the tough and hopeless

corners of the world. Instead of having more Americans serving in military bands than the diplomatic corps, we need to grow our foreign service.”<sup>20</sup>

### **Bonds, Borders, and Dissolving Boundaries**

With globalization, boundaries dissolve and ambiguous but potent spaces of transformation and threat are created, which blur the edges of national borders. There is danger, however, in focusing only on the thickening crossroads and failing to see that cultural and physical geography endures. Cultural identity sharpens in threshold encounters, complicating collaborative solutions to problems that transcend borders. Diplomacy, according to diplomatic studies scholar Paul Sharp, is the traditional bridging response to the “common problem of living separately and wanting to do so, while having to conduct relations with others.”<sup>21</sup> To address the challenges that arise from dissolving boundaries and the continuing bonded communities of international life, U.S. foreign policy “must still retain the traditional instruments of

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diplomacy and security for a world of states.” At the same time, as historian Charles Maier argues, “it also needs to develop a new repertory for national societies in their own right as they are caught up in wrenching transformations that their political systems only partially control.”<sup>22</sup>

This new repertory of skills and instruments is inherently political. It begins with a willingness to consider the implications of human plurality, and a recognition that, as the United States pursues its own objectives internationally, Americans are dealing with over six billion other people collected in national societies. Each of these societies arises from distinct histories, with interests, values, and goals of its own. Recognition of this requires a humble acceptance of the limits of American power, given what British political theorist John Dunn calls the “infinite series of imponderable and bitterly contentious choices” that politically awakened and technologically empowered people make. Ultimately, they—not we—carve out the direction of their history.<sup>23</sup> At the same time, recognition of the empowerment of others also demands that as we calibrate the instruments of our international power, we recognize that our “wasting” military and diminished economic assets provide no shortcut to the creation, maintenance, and thickening of the bonds of connectedness across bounded national societies whose trust and cooperation we need to be safe and secure in today’s world.

The United States needs a new diplomacy that recognizes—and is designed to engage—the vastly increased number of people whose opinions are politically important within the sovereign states that are, as President Obama said in Moscow in July 2009, “the cornerstone of international order.”<sup>24</sup> This is not to suggest that public opinion is certain to be right or

that it is certain to prevail. Rather, it is to acknowledge, as the President Emeritus of the Council of Foreign Relations Leslie Gelb does, that “real international negotiations take place more within nations than between them,” as domestic politics shape the positions advanced by states internationally.<sup>25</sup> The hard slogging grassroots work at the nexus of foreign policy, public opinion, and politics abroad is the mission of public diplomacy.<sup>26</sup>

For example, the U.S.- Mexico relationship could not be more challenging to U.S. national security institutions that must acknowledge and contend with the profusion of domestic political stakeholders on both sides of the Rio Grande. Trade, immigration, drugs, and guns are some of the most politicized and publicized issues within the domestic politics of both states, even without a war against drug cartels, an economic recession, or a swine flu pandemic spilling across borders. Confronting any of these challenges requires the full bilateral cooperation of nation-states in the traditional sense. But it also requires going beyond traditional diplomacy to understand and address the sociopolitical forces that operate within and between the United States and Mexico.

The complexity of the politics in the Mexican-American relationship is magnified by intense media coverage. Audiences on each side of the border interpret the messages heard in completely different ways because of their distinct political-cultural identities, which are intensified by the permeability of the border. Proximity calls out difference, and media coverage can trigger historic animosities, heighten the sensitivities of Mexican sovereignty, and draw both polities into play as we cooperate to address the broad challenges that both societies and their governments face. Given the centrality of mediated political communication to the bilateral relationship, diplomats must recognize that the public sphere is the policy sphere and be skilled at working citizen perceptions as well as the corridors of power.<sup>27</sup>

Geographic proximity and border permeability are critical to the deepening chaos in Afghanistan and Pakistan, as well. Historic national animosity between the two neighboring states, combined with tribal diffusion across national boundaries, complicates the war against the Taliban on both sides of the Durand Line. Both states were already at high risk of collapse before the current global economic recession brutalized their populations, Pakistan’s in particular. The perceived imperative to stabilize Afghanistan and Pakistan economically as well as militarily has transformed President Obama’s limited counter-terrorism objective—“to disrupt, dismantle and defeat al-Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan”—into a broader, more expensive, and longer term counterinsurgency effort that could last many years.<sup>28</sup> Diplomacy in this war zone is on the front lines and moves to the sound of guns.

As in Mexico, the insurgents in Afghanistan and Pakistan have access to money generated from an illicit drug trade to expand their operations. And like Mexico, unless Pakistani and Afghan societies identify with and support their states’ and allied military strategies as their own, the fight against insurgents will not be politically viable and will fail. Politically awakened publics, especially in war-torn Central Asia, are passionate about

their beliefs and interests and, according to the *Brave New War* author John Robb, “will shift their loyalties to any group that will provide them security and the basics of survival.”<sup>29</sup> If the governments of these countries fail to reflect their citizens’ values and meet their populations’ needs—in fact and in perception—the NATO military intervention will only breed more insurgents who feed on the western presence until it is driven out of the region. Consequently, part of the counterinsurgency strategy includes extending the reach of media to isolated populations, disseminating counter propaganda, and building the capability of the government and the private sector to effectively communicate with and engage the populations of both countries.

If the United States government fails to reflect the values or meet the needs of Americans (again, in fact and perception) during this time of deep recession and mushrooming federal debt and deficits, American political opinion will see the massive war bills as intolerable given other pressing priorities, and will thus constrain the administration’s leeway to continue the war. Already, Special Envoy to Afghanistan and Pakistan Richard Holbrooke admits, “we all feel the impatience and pressure of the American public and Congress which legitimately wants to see progress.”<sup>30</sup>

### Mediated Diplomacy

Perhaps sensing the need for a guide to lead them across the threshold to this abruptly changed new era, the American people elected the boundary dissolving Barack Obama as president. Black and white, with Christian and Muslim forefathers, President Obama dashed onto the global stage, first flying through London, Strasbourg, and Ankara, with the fleet-footed intelligence required in a world that is “messy, unpredictable and far from equilibrium.”<sup>31</sup> His personal popularity on the spring 2009 European tour muted the inclination to blame the United States for the global economic crisis, but failed to overcome the European reluctance to increase their own stimulus spending or send significantly more combat troops to Afghanistan, as the United States had requested.

A gifted messenger aware that his face mirrored many of those on the Cairo streets, President Obama projects a cultural ambiguity that invites attention—something that, no doubt, helped him carry his message of engagement into Arab living rooms in June 2009. Interviewed prior to the speech, Obama said, “What I do believe is that if we are engaged in speaking directly to the Arab street, and they are persuaded that we are operating in a straightforward manner, then, at the margins, both they and their leadership are more inclined and able to work with us.”<sup>32</sup>

Because the world’s people increasingly get their information about the United States from non-western sources whose framing of the issues is congruent with local political cultures, “speaking directly” is not that easy to do. According to political communication scholar Robert Entman, when other political cultures are neutral or hostile to American foreign policy, their media reflect that perspective as they interpret and reframe the mes-

sage.<sup>33</sup> Crafting American official messages that take this into account and are sensitive to the narrative schema held by audiences can be marginally successful, as it was in the case of Obama’s culturally congruent speeches in Cairo and Accra. But, the effect is transitory unless the words are married to deeds that are congruent and seem to be legitimate because they are reinforced by local credible voices who have been cultivated by politically skilled and culturally adroit public diplomats on the ground. Diplomatic engagement with indigenous social networks is a necessary condition for the practice of persuasion even though the ability to shape a foreign political communication system’s interpretation of an official American message is limited.<sup>34</sup>

Some foreign policy experts like Leslie Gelb question the premise that the soft power inherent in having an attractive, globally popular president can “cause other leaders to alter their assessments of their own national interests or do what they don’t want to do.”<sup>35</sup> Other experts, led by soft-power advocate Joe Nye, insist that power be understood more broadly “to include the ability to persuade others do what they come to see as being in their own interest.”<sup>36</sup> To create the political space for foreign leaders to respond favorably in diplomatic negotiations to American policy initiatives, there needs to be more confidence among their populations that working with the United States will be beneficial for them. Absent that confidence, foreign leaders will be constrained by their domestic public opinion and demur.

This is not an argument for “telling America’s story to the world” in an effort to burnish the dimming glow of American exceptionalism.<sup>37</sup> Because the reference point is other people’s hopes, aspirations, and fears, the narrative should not be America’s story. Rather it should be the human story and how the United States relates to those outside its borders. The more

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the United States highlights American identity, the more it creates a target for those whose identity is formed by being “not-American.” This negative identity, and the political power that flows from it, re-

quire an inflated image of the United States to shove away from. As a matter of effective global communication strategy, Americans should not contribute by singing our own praises. This self-referential focus works against American credibility as moral leaders in an age of globalization.<sup>38</sup>

Creating the confidence among foreign populations that working with the United States will be beneficial for them demands vigorous engagement on both policy and sociocultural issues. It requires an understanding of what is credible and politically viable in the context of other societies who interpret messages sent to them in terms of their own realities. These social realities include not only their political and cultural frames but also interpretations of the “real agendas” of messengers. Russians, for example,

did not warm to President Obama when he visited in July 2009. The state-controlled media did not carry his speech live and played down the visit. His personal story does not resonate with Russians, whose disillusionment with the United States and distrust of American foreign policy objectives is profound. Additionally, given the current economic crisis, America's economic model is far less attractive to young Russian graduates of the New Economic School who were the polite audience for his major foreign policy speech in Moscow. Given Russia's increasingly authoritarian turn, public opinion may matter less there than it does in other European countries or in Japan, where the announced advance in the U.S. - Russian nuclear arms reduction process was welcomed by attentive publics.

### Diplomacy Deficit

President Obama may be a gifted storyteller capable of constructing a vision of mutual interest and mutual respect with many foreign publics, but he is not a magician. We need to recognize that there is no wand he can wave to close the gap between what America is capable of doing and the global challenges of this era. Currently, distorted instruments of statecraft constrain effective American foreign policy across the board. The wooden image of defense, diplomacy, and development as the three separate legs of the stool of American foreign policy, advanced earlier this year by Secretary of State Hilary Clinton, may serve as an expression of the emerging priorities of the Obama administration's foreign affairs strategy, but it wrongly suggests that the three instruments of state power are in equilibrium.

With defense funded at twelve times the level of all non-military instruments of statecraft for much of the last decade—doubling since 2001 alone—the United States actually has a single large pogo stick with development and diplomacy as atrophied appendages that provide little to balance the military thrust

of America's global engagement.<sup>39</sup> Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and scores of articulate soldier-scholars understand this truth and have repeatedly called for resourcing diplomacy to do the job that American national security requires. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Michael Mullen con-

tended as recently as February 2009 that “we are a good decade away” from creating that civilian capability, although it is desperately needed.<sup>40</sup>

This allocation of funding results from past political choices that lock future policy makers into using the instruments they have at their disposal,

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whether appropriate to the challenge or not. Over the last two decades, the United States has concretized its vision of the role it should play in the world in budgets that have hollowed out the national capacity to engage the world except through force of arms. The utility of that force in establishing the conditions that will make America safe and secure deserve far more debate than domestic politics since 2001 have allowed.<sup>41</sup>

The analogy of the three-legged stool also does little to capture the complexity of the job each leg is called on to perform among the people of the world in this time of political ferment. Significant portions of the American military that have learned the ground truth of battle in Iraq and

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Afghanistan know that the support of local populations is key to success. The COIN (counterinsurgency) doctrine adopted by the entire U.S. government in the waning days of the Bush administration in January 2009, looks for synergy among political, security, economic, and informational activities, and demands unity of effort between participants.<sup>42</sup>

This is easier said than done. When the civilian capacity is simply not there, the military of necessity moves beyond its core security function to fill the vacuum, performing functions for which it was not trained, thus militarizing American foreign policy.

One of those functions is public diplomacy. According to the Government Accountability Office, since 9/11, the Department of Defense (DoD) has spent “\$10 billion on communication efforts designed to advance the strategic interests of the United States.”<sup>43</sup> This dwarfs the funding available to the Department of State and puts most of America’s official communicators in combat boots. Although there is initial questioning of this practice by the House Appropriations Committee, which seeks better oversight, the House Armed Services Committee wants DoD to do even more. In the FY 2010 defense authorization bill, the Armed Services Committee calls for the development of a strategic communication capability within the DoD to serve as a “soft power complement to traditional hard-power tools.”<sup>44</sup> This misguided initiative would continue shifting instruments of statecraft to the DoD toolbox, making it even more difficult to advance American interests by building international co-operation. By failing to anchor our use of force in a broader political process, and instead directing our political advocacy through the Defense Department, we open ourselves up to the delegitimization strategies of others and erode any influence we might have among democratic nations.

Surprisingly, given President Obama’s rhetoric about the need for a civilian surge to conduct our foreign affairs, his proposed 2010 budget would only increase funds allocated to diplomacy and development by “less

than half of one percent of what we spend on the defense budget portion of national security (excluding costs to actually fight two wars).<sup>45</sup> Even that small increase—which does not go far enough to realign our instruments of statecraft to match the role the Obama administration says the United States should play in the world—does not appear to be politically viable in Congress. Rather than resourcing the instruments of political action that we need to address the “full strategic buffet” of national security problems we face, from environmental disaster to nuclear proliferation, we will continue as a nation “to stand under the sign of brute force,” as Hannah Arendt once put it.<sup>46</sup> That mark makes it even more difficult for us to listen, to be heard, and to lead in the development of a constructive international agenda.

If the United States intends to engage the world in pursuit of its national interests and values, it had better make sure its politics at home recognize the altered realities of the world today and America’s place in it. Although the United States has the world’s largest economy, collectively we are a debtor nation restricted in economic power to induce others to follow our lead or engage in state-building projects abroad. And after eight years of war in the Middle East, the American ability to use military power to coerce others to comply with our national security strategies is weakened. Moreover, the “halo of moral sanctity” that marks America’s self-image as liberator of the world’s oppressed is tarnished by the facts of our actions.<sup>47</sup> As Reinhold Neibuhr warned, continuing to be enthralled by the “false allure of simple solutions” that would have us rise above politics on the shoulders of markets, military power, or theories of justice will surely make the United States less safe and less able to advance its national security interests in a changing world.<sup>48</sup>

It is time to accept as truth John Dunn’s conclusion that “politics will endure as long as people are aware that large numbers of distant human beings affect their lives in ways that really matter to them.”<sup>49</sup> Meeting the political challenge will require the revitalization of American

foreign affairs institutions and personnel to manage relationships with societies and governments on very specific political and cultural landscapes that determine the conditions that affect our lives.

This task will be made more difficult by the profound changes in what Michael Schudson called “the whole ‘information ecology’ of political and social life today.”<sup>50</sup> Because of on-line access to global media and social networking technologies, politically attentive citizens around the planet have broader, deeper access to one another and information about world politics than ever before. If they can keep an open mind, they can access expanded debate and process what they read critically. However, if they become com-

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If online citizens become committed partisans, blinded by their particular filters, they will enter into an echo chamber that distorts external reality and makes their existing views more extreme.

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mitted partisans, blinded by their particular filters, they will enter into an echo chamber that distorts external reality and makes their existing views more extreme.

To engage a multi-channel, communication-poor world grown skeptical about the competence and credibility of the United States, we must exploit our technological edge and vastly expand our international media presence. To enlarge the circle of those willing to pay attention to those airborne perspectives, the United States must build on successful exchange programs and expand face-to-face contact at the ground level. The United States government spends many billions of dollars intercepting and analyzing messages, but only a fraction in personal engagement within foreign cultures.<sup>51</sup> As the rest rise, the world rebalances, American power wanes, and societies are aroused and empowered, only politics within states and between them promise a way forward. It is time to refocus on the political ground game and wear some holes in American shoe leather as we engage the cultural and political particulars of human plurality in the global public square.

### Notes

<sup>1</sup> Walzer, Michael. *Politics and Passion*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004. For a discussion of the importance of states in arriving at global equality read the concluding chapter.

<sup>2</sup> Legro, Jeffery W. "Renewal of America's Internationalism." In *Avoiding Trivia: The Role of Strategic Planning in American Foreign Policy*, edited by Daniel W. Drezner. Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2009, 60.

<sup>3</sup> *Wasting asset* is a term used by defense strategists to convey the idea that traditional means and methods of projecting power and accessing the global commons are growing increasingly obsolete. This concept is discussed in Krepinevich Jr., Andrew F. "The Pentagon's Wasting Assets." *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 2009.

<sup>4</sup> "Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World." *National Intelligence Council*, November 2008.

<sup>5</sup> Legro, Jeffery W. "Renewal of America's Internationalism." In *Avoiding Trivia: The Role of Strategic Planning in American Foreign Policy*, edited by Daniel W. Drezner. Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2009, 62.

<sup>6</sup> Arendt, Hannah. *The Promise of Politics*. New York: Schocken Books, 2005.

<sup>7</sup> Zakaria, Fareed. *The Post American World*. New York: Norton & Co, 2008, 31–40.

<sup>8</sup> Walzer, Michael. *Politics and Passion*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004, 136.

<sup>9</sup> Katzenstein, Peter J. and Keohane, Robert O. *Anti-Americanisms in World Politics*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007, 33.

<sup>10</sup> Kurlantzick, Joshua. *Charm Offensive: How China's Soft Power is Transforming The World*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007, 29.

<sup>11</sup> "Not just straw men," *The Economist*, June 18, 2009, [http://www.economist.com/world/international/displaystory.cfm?story\\_id=13871969](http://www.economist.com/world/international/displaystory.cfm?story_id=13871969).

<sup>12</sup> Wax, Emily. "Fresh Reports, Imagery Contradict Sri Lanka on Civilian No-Fire Zone." *The Washington Post*, May 30, 2009, A12.

<sup>13</sup> The United States is not a signatory to the Rome Statute, which set up the International Criminal Court in 2002. But, U.S. based NGOs were active in seeking the ICC action.

<sup>14</sup> Abramowitz Morton and Parke, Natalie "Bashing Bashir," *The National Interest online*, March 24, 2008. <http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=21144>.

<sup>15</sup> Alexander, David. "Obama names Gration as special envoy to Sudan." *Reuters*. March 18, 2009. <http://www.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis/idUSN18343231>.

<sup>16</sup> Tarrow, Sidney. *The New Transnational Activism*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

- <sup>17</sup> Niebuhr, Reinhold. *Moral Man and Immoral Society*. New York: Charles Scribners, 1932, republished 1960. 4.
- <sup>18</sup> Kulish, Nicholas and Judy Dempsey. "Merkel Is Set to Greet, and Then Resist, Obama." *New York Times*, March 29, 2009, A6
- <sup>19</sup> Transcript of Obama News Conference in London Excel Center. White House. April 2, 2009. [http://www.whitehouse.gov/the\\_press\\_office/News-Conference-by-President-Obama-4-02-09/](http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/News-Conference-by-President-Obama-4-02-09/).
- <sup>20</sup> Obama, Barack. Foreign policy speech given at DePaul University in Chicago, October 2, 2007. <http://www.cfr.org/publication/14356>.
- <sup>21</sup> Paul Sharp's definition of diplomacy as quoted by Jonsson, Christer. "Global Governance: Challenges to Diplomatic Communication, Representation and Recognition." In *Global Governance and Diplomacy: Worlds Apart?* edited by Andrew F. Cooper, Brian Hocking, and William Maley, 30. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, July 2008.
- <sup>22</sup> Maier, Charles S. "Beyond Statecraft." In *To Lead The World*, edited by Marvyn P. Leffler and Jeffery W. Legro, 61. London: Oxford University Press, 2008.
- <sup>23</sup> Dunn, John. *The Cunning of Unreason*. London: Basic Books, 2005, 363.
- <sup>24</sup> "Remarks By The President At The New Economic School Graduation." White House, July 7, 2009, [http://www.whitehouse.gov/the\\_press\\_office/REMARKS-BY-THE-PRESIDENT-AT-THE-NEW-ECONOMIC-SCHOOL-GRADUATION/](http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/REMARKS-BY-THE-PRESIDENT-AT-THE-NEW-ECONOMIC-SCHOOL-GRADUATION/).
- <sup>25</sup> Gelb, Leslie. *Power Rules: How Common Sense Can Rescue American Foreign Policy*. New York: Harper Collins, 2009, 140.
- <sup>26</sup> As Counselor for USIA from 1993–96, I wrote an Agency mission statement for public diplomacy that was instituted and would still be valid in this context: "To understand, inform and influence foreign publics in pursuit of the national interest; and to broaden the dialog between Americans, their institutions and counterparts abroad."
- <sup>27</sup> For a provocative picture of what one Canadian diplomat believes the future diplomats should be see Copeland, Daryl. *Guerrilla Diplomacy*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2009.
- <sup>28</sup> A counterinsurgency campaign attempts to secure the population, provide basic services and strengthen support for the government. A counter-terrorism strategy would focus on going after al-Qaida directly. For a full discussion of the concepts see: Kilcullen, David. *The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One*. London: Oxford University Press, 2009. For a detailed portrait of the cultural and political landscape read Rashid, Ahmed. *Decent into Chaos: The U.S. And the Disaster in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia*. New York: Penguin Group, 2009. For an elucidation of the importance of Pakistan to American national security read: Sanger, David. *The Inheritance: The World Obama Confronts and the Challenges to American Power*. New York: Harmony Books, 2009.
- <sup>29</sup> Robb, John. "Threats to U.S. Security in the Early 21st Century." Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, April 2, 2009. For further understanding of this conceptual approach see: Robb, John. *Brave New War: The Next State of Terrorism and the End of Globalization*. New York: John Wiley & Sons. 2007.
- <sup>30</sup> Ackerman, Spencer. "Obama Faces Rising Anxiety on Afghanistan." *The Washington Independent*. August 12, 2009. <http://washingtonindependent.com/54840/obama-faces-rising-anxiety-on-afghanistan>
- <sup>31</sup> Robb, John. "Threats to U.S. Security in the Early 21st Century." Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, April 2, 2009.
- <sup>32</sup> Friedman, Tom. "Obama On Obama." *New York Times*, June 3, 2009.
- <sup>33</sup> Entman, Robert. "Theorizing Mediated Public Diplomacy: The U.S. Case." In *The International Journal of Press/Politics*. 13(2) April 2008, 87–102.
- <sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>35</sup> Gelb, Leslie. *Power Rules: How Common Sense Can Rescue American Foreign Policy*. New York: Harper Collins, 2009, 219.
- <sup>36</sup> Nye, Joseph S. "Get Smart: Combining Hard and Soft Power." *Foreign Policy*, July/August 2009, 161.
- <sup>37</sup> "Telling America's Story To The World" was engraved on the USIA Headquarters at 1776 Pennsylvania Ave., Washington D.C. The Agency was eliminated in 1999 and its functions folded into the State Department.

<sup>38</sup> I first made this argument in 2006. For the context see: Fulton, Barry, Bruce Gregory, Donna Marie Oglesby, Walter R. Roberts, and Barry Zorthian. “A Dissent: Transformation Not Restoration,” dissent to the January 2005 Public Diplomacy Council report, “A Call for Action on Public Diplomacy,” 2006.

<sup>39</sup> Deibel, Terry L. *Foreign Affairs Strategy: Logic For American Statecraft*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007, 277–280.

<sup>40</sup> Remarks by Adm. Mike Mullen presented at Princeton University on February 05, 2009. <http://www.jcs.mil/speech.aspx?ID=1041>.

<sup>41</sup> Smith, Rupert. *The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World*. New York: Knopf, 2007.

<sup>42</sup> “U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide.” *State Department Bureau of Political and Military Affairs*. January 2009. [www.state.gov/t/pm/ppa/pmpppt](http://www.state.gov/t/pm/ppa/pmpppt).

<sup>43</sup> “Concerns Loom About Public Diplomacy, Strategic Communications.” *Inside The Pentagon*, vol. 25, no. 27. July 9, 2009. [http://www.defensenewsstand.com/cs\\_newsletters.asp?NLN=PENTAGON](http://www.defensenewsstand.com/cs_newsletters.asp?NLN=PENTAGON).

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>45</sup> Kissinger, Henry, George Shultz, James Baker, Lawrence Eagleburger, Warren Christopher, Madeleine Albright, Colin Powell, and Condoleezza Rice. “U.S. Needs More Diplomats.” *Politico*, June 25, 2009. <http://dyn.politico.com/printstory.cfm?uuid=14171A4B-18FE-70B2-A84B007B1D7399A3>.

<sup>46</sup> For “the sign of brute force” see Arendt, 192. For “strategic buffet” see Gregory, Bruce. “Public Diplomacy and National Security: Lessons From the U.S. Experience,” *Small Wars Journal*, posted by SWJ editors, August 14, 2008. <http://smallwarsjournal.com/mag/2008/08/public-diplomacy-and-national.php>.

<sup>47</sup> Bacevich, Andrew, J. “Introduction” to Neibuhr, Reinhold. *The Irony of American History*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008, xiii.

<sup>48</sup> Reinhold Niebuhr as quoted in Bacevich, Andrew, “*Illusions of Managing History: The Enduring Relevance of Reinhold Niebuhr*,” University Lecture, October 9, 2007. <http://www.pbs.org/moyers/journal/08152008/profile3.html>.

<sup>49</sup> Dunn, John. *The Cunning of Unreason*. London: Basic Books, 2005, 135.

<sup>50</sup> Schudson, Michael. *Why Democracies Need An Unlovable Press*. Cambridge: Policy Press, 2008, 7.

<sup>51</sup> Fulton, Barry, Bruce Gregory, Donna Marie Oglesby, Walter R. Roberts, and Barry Zorthian. “A Dissent: Transformation Not Restoration,” dissent to the January 2005 Public Diplomacy Council report, “A Call for Action on Public Diplomacy,” 2006.