

This web site was copied prior to January 20, 2005. It is now a Federal record managed by the National Archives and Records Administration. External links, forms, and search boxes may not function within this collection. [Learn more.](#) [\[hide\]](#)

[Home](#) • [Education & Training](#) • [Grants & Fellowships](#) • [Policy Research](#) • [Library & Links](#) • [Publications](#) • [News & Media](#)



United States Institute of Peace

[Site Map](#) | [Search](#) [GO](#)

[Virtual Diplomacy Homepage](#) >> [Virtual Diplomacy Publications](#) >> **Net Diplomacy II**

Released Online
11 October 2002

CONTENTS

[PART ONE](#)

[Introduction](#)

- [Beyond Foreign Ministries](#)
- [Beyond Old Borders](#)
- [2015 and Beyond](#)

[Diplomacy.Cultural2015@State.Gov](#)

- [People on the Move](#)
- [Hyperculture](#)
- [Bats and Owls and the Insane Moon](#)
- [Policy Options: Disengagement, Defense, or Dialogue](#)

- [Endnotes](#)

[PART TWO](#)

[PART THREE](#)

[About the Report](#)

[About the Editor](#)



virtual *Diplomacy*

Net Diplomacy II

Beyond Old Borders

Barry Fulton (editor)

The views expressed in this report are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. government, the Department of Defense, or any of its agencies.

I am probably going to bring in some of my colleagues from that world I was in for the last seven years--Steve Case, Michael Bell, Andy Grove, a few other people like that--who really know what they're talking about ... to come in and find out what we can do.

--Secretary of State Colin Powell, January 25, 2001

Introduction

As the Communist Revolution ended with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the Information Revolution reached the tipping point as corporations embraced the new technologies. The U. S. Department of State, while marking the end of the Cold War, continued to be guided by practices more fitting to an earlier age. Indeed, decision making has become more centralized, access more restricted, and information flow more inhibited.

This state of affairs has been documented by several studies, including *Reinventing Diplomacy in the Information Age*, *Equipped for the Future: Managing U.S. Foreign Affairs in the 21st Century*, and *America's Overseas Presence in the 21st Century*. In the first week of the Bush administration, former Defense Secretary Frank Carlucci presented to Secretary of State Colin Powell a "resources-for-reform" proposal calling for the Department of State to undertake fundamental change, including upgrading information technology and adopting modern management practices. Cosponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations and the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the proposal, *State Department Reform*, represents a consensus among research institutions, scholars, and professionals that the time has come for action. "In short," the task force said, "renewal of America's foreign policy making and implementing machinery is an urgent national security priority.

The National Intelligence Council invited a group of scholars to look ahead and describe the security environment of 2015. Their discerning report, entitled *Global Trends 2015: A Dialogue About the Future*

with Nongovernment Experts, was published in December 2000. The panel concluded that "diplomacy will be more complicated. Washington will have greater difficulty harnessing its power to achieve specific foreign policy goals: the U.S. Government will exercise a smaller and less powerful part of the overall economic and cultural influence of the United States abroad."

In July 2001 *iMP: The Magazine on Information Impacts* invited twenty-three American and British experts to examine the *Global Trends* study and imagine the state of diplomacy in 2015. How will it look? And how will we get there? Among the writers, broad agreement exists that diplomacy must change if it is to continue to be an effective element of statecraft in a world endangered by a panoply of destabilizing threats. They also agree that even as information technology wisely deployed is a necessary element of a new diplomacy, profound changes in its culture and practice will be required to restore its primacy by 2015. And practically everyone agrees that the public dimension of diplomacy increases in importance as the world's population becomes more engaged.

Beyond Foreign Ministries

Henry E. Catto, Jr. reminds us that there are certain core diplomatic practices that must be retained, but urges more attention to public diplomacy and an appreciation of "soft power" as a central element of international relations. Anthony C. E. Quainton posits that diplomats must assume the role of "change insurgents," thereby creating a state of dynamic turbulence that will lead to the internal reform of current diplomatic practices. Jeffrey R. Cooper explains the external forces that are driving changes in diplomacy: political revolution, economic revolution, and the information revolution.

Brian Hocking insists that we differentiate the mechanisms and processes of diplomacy to resolve the apparent paradox between expanding and contracting diplomatic requirements. Sheryl J. Brown and Margarita S. Studemeister describe the diffusion of diplomacy whereby academics, corporations, nongovernmental organizations, and others assume traditional diplomatic roles through the power of networking. Howard Cincotta writes that effecting the transition from the hierarchical, closed, and classified nature of modern diplomacy to the openness, flexibility, and speed of postmodern diplomacy is one of the chief challenges for the diplomatic community.

Beyond Old Borders

Donna Oglesby, pointing to the limits of military power in dealing with fragmenting states, persuasively calls for cultural dialogue as a necessary precondition for solving the emerging problems of the twenty-first century. Larry Seaquist writes that the diplomat of 2015 must be prepared to build peace in a world where local conflict and civilian warriors threaten the stability of communities and nations. Jody K. Olsen and Norman J. Peterson urge that technology be used to complement, but not replace, educational and cultural exchanges. Mark Leonard and Liz Noble suggest that traditional diplomacy needs to be broadened beyond foreign ministries to address increasingly important publics throughout the world. These five authors would agree that creating trust underpins diplomacy in 2015.

Walter R. Roberts argues that state broadcasting will continue as an element of public diplomacy in 2015, but believes the array of U.S. government services today is duplicative, expensive, and even counterproductive. Adam Clayton Powell III, celebrating the breadth and reach of the Internet, hints that state-sponsored broadcasting may become irrelevant. The Internet is the wild card in 2015, Robert Coonrod points out. He suggests that traditional government broadcasters will regard radio as a means to counter specific challenges or threats, but will abandon the practice of projecting their societies and cultures.

2015 and Beyond

Charles A. Schmitz, writing with savage wit, describes the diplomatic environment of 2015, enhanced by technology and constrained by politics. If this mind-stretching disquisition strikes you as far-fetched, Richard P. O'Neill goes out on a technological limb as he considers what 2015 may offer from three categories of predictive structure: the linear extrapolation, the missed discontinuity, and the breathless proclamation. And Steven Livingston shows how high-resolution public satellite imagery will further change

the diplomatic landscape by introducing still another dimension of transparency in international relations.

Stephanie Smith Kinney calls for a new culture of diplomacy that puts as much primacy on action as it does on observation and reflection. John Hemery says that training diplomats for 2015 must reflect changes in the role of foreign ministries and give greater attention to interaction in cyberspace, public diplomacy, international financial markets, and results-oriented management. Wilson Dizard, Jr. asserts optimistically that the State Department is about to witness a dramatic upgrading of its information resources; the new agenda of diplomacy-from trade issues to human rights-he writes, is being increasingly shaped by the information revolution. Jamie F. Metz, insisting that overclassification of information has become a national liability in the Information Age, calls for a new diplomacy that replaces an obsession with secrecy with a culture of openness.

As the revolution in military affairs moves ahead at the Pentagon, a counterpart revolution in diplomatic affairs must surely follow. Not just desktop Internet connections, but a bottom-to-top overhaul of the conduct of diplomacy. Not just in Foggy Bottom, but throughout the democratic world. If the vision of the year 2015 represented in this edition of *iMP* is on target, it is past time for the revolution to begin.

Released: July 23, 2001

iMP Magazine: http://www.cisp.org/imp/july_2001/07_editorial.htm

(c) 2001. Barry Fulton. All rights reserved.

[Back to Top](#)

diplomacy.cultural2015@state.gov

Americans need to fund, support, and embark on genuine voyages of discovery beyond the cultural boundaries of neighboring landscapes of meaning through the exchange of ideas, arts, and persons, through scholarly cooperation and the facilitation of cross-cultural understanding.

--Donna Oglesby

Donna Oglesby is diplomat-in-residence at Eckerd College, where as a professor of international relations and global affairs (IRGA), she teaches "Media and Foreign Policy," "Politics and Process of U.S. Foreign Policy," and the IRGA senior seminar. Oglesby spent more than twenty-five years in cultural and public diplomacy, culminating in service as counselor of the agency, the ranking career position in the United States Information Agency (USIA). Oglesby welcomes comments on her article at oglesbdm@eckerd.edu.

The transformation of politics, economics, and society caused by globalization would appear to be changing the world in the twenty-first century. Some imagine that the rich, and occasionally troublesome cultural boundaries between humans will be erased. We should take a closer look.

People on the Move

Imagine we are living in 2015. Some 7.2 billion people roam the planet Earth. Most move into rapidly expanding urban areas. Megacities, of 10 to 28 million humans, dot the continents. The combination of population growth and urbanization makes it tough for political systems to respond to increasing demands for security, services, and sense of community. Governance is made harder still by legal and illegal cross-border migration of millions of people yearly. Migrants, more than 15 percent of the total population in more than 50 countries, leave their homes to escape war and persecution or to go where they can find jobs in unevenly developed regional and global economies.¹

Even a casual reading of today's newspapers tells us what this near future might be like:

Casa Blanca, Mexico--The quaint houses on Pancho Villa Street tell lies with their fresh coats of paint, rooftop satellite dishes and swing sets out back. Almost no one lives here anymore. The families--usually fathers first, followed years later by their wives and children--have been swept north by the desperate torrent that carries floods of immigrants to the United States, leaving widening swaths of central Mexico

*abandoned. In the last decade, most of the 5,800 people living in Casa Blanca have moved to Tulsa, Oklahoma....The question we always ask is will our community survive?*²

*Pomona, New York--Everyone crowded onto the fresh black asphalt and stood looking up at the gods. There they were, monkey gods and winged gods, sleeping gods and praying gods, posed around the ornate onion-domed towers of the Sri Ranganatha Temple, awaiting consecration....One person opted out of the holy shower: Kimberley Camburn, who had brought her Holstein cow, Hope, from nearby Stormville early in the morning and watched as Hindu women, many of them more at home in front of a computer than an udder, milked her in the temple.*³

*Queens, New York City--A Web site run by militant Hindus in Queens and Long Island was recently shut down by its service provider because of complaints that it advocated hatred and violence toward Muslims. But a few days later, the site was back on the Internet. The unlikely rescuers were some radical Jews in Brooklyn who are under investigation for possible ties to anti-Arab terrorist organizations in Israel. The unusual alliance brings together two extreme religious philosophies from different parts of the world that, at first glance, have little in common. But living elbow-to-elbow in the ethnic mix of New York, the small groups of Hindus and Jews have discovered that sharing a distant enemy is sufficient basis for friendship...."We are fighting the same war," said Rohit Vyasmaan, who helps run the Hindu Web site, HinduUnity.org, from his home in Flushing, Queens. "Whether you call them Palestinians, Afghans, or Pakistanis, the root of the problem for Hindus and Jews is Islam." The budding Hindu-Jewish relationship presents a view that counters a popular perception of New York City--not as an open door to immigrants seeking a better life, but as a political way station, where some people come or stay not to make money but to engage in politics from afar.*⁴

People on the move have always carried their wants and needs, their fears and hopes along with them. Now more than ever, they also carry their politics and their culture. Some are highly skilled cosmopolitans who travel the world easily in the comfortable bubble of the transnational network. Others are low-skilled economic migrants, refugees, or asylum seekers whose global journey is more wrenching because, when relocating out of political or economic necessity, they also place their social identity at risk. Clinging to their cultural community when their physical survival requires migration from their place of birth, humans hold on to the safety and security of the meaningful as they understand it to be.

With global migrations now near historic peaks once again, the difference between past movements and migrants today is that now the cultural and political roots people carry are not planted in new *terra firma* adjusting to conditions there; rather they are nourished in a hydroponic fashion from selected streams of cultural and political ideas flowing constantly around the globe. For the exterritorial cosmopolitans who see national boundaries and nation-states as increasingly irrelevant to life in the twenty-first century, "there is a sense in which they inhabit a socio-cultural bubble that is insulated from the harsher differences between national cultures....They are cosmopolitan to be sure, but in ways that are very limited and insular."⁵ Connected by e-mail and mobile phones to the business at hand, they are deliberately detached from any roots that bind to a community of place.⁶

On the other hand, low-skilled economic migrants, refugees, or asylum seekers are disconnected from the territory in which they work or seek refuge precisely because they are still attached to a community of place elsewhere. "The sense of place is the need not to belong to 'society' in the abstract, but to somewhere in particular: in satisfying that need, people develop commitment and loyalty."⁷ The deterritorialized maintenance of cultural community may seem odd to those raised on the land of the last century, but to global migrants in the twenty-first century it means that a sense of place is a state of mind. In diasporas, people identify even more intensely with a homeland. They carry their belongings with them, and when they migrate in large numbers together, their communal culture travels too.

Whether sending or receiving these extensive human migrations, whether homogenizing their nation by expelling the "other" from within or diversifying their populations by accepting the "other" from abroad, all governments face the resulting challenge of redefining national identity and citizenship. All individuals--even those who have never left a place transformed around them by immigration--face the challenge of identity and meaning in their lives. Who am I? Where do I belong? What are my loyalties? People in times

of upheaval such as ours often define who they are by who they are not. They seek safety in voluntary ghettos where sameness, and therefore safety, rules. Consequently, the weaving of one plural societal tapestry from the warp and woof of communal difference does not occur. There is no unity in our variety because the movement of people is no guarantee of a transformed mind.

Hyperculture

In this century, the negotiation of political and cultural identity on the part of billions of individuals colliding and converging as the result of extensive physical movement is intensified by communication media that liberate communities from territory. Where once the dominance of print media both created and bound cultures in an expanded but still physical space,⁸ today's electronic media erase geographic boundaries altogether. The power of twenty-first century humans to live in an *ideoscape* of their own choosing gives new meaning to Walter Lippmann's observation in 1922 that "in the great blooming, buzzing confusion of the outer world we pick out what our culture has already defined for us."⁹

The old mass media age of Lippmann is gone. In the place of shared mediated images of the "world out there" brought by national broadcast media and general interest newspapers and magazines, technology has made it even more possible for people to exercise their psychological inclination to filter what they choose to hear, see, and read. Personalized electronic editions of the daily news--in which individuals can preselect precisely what interests them and avoid inconvenient information that might challenge their worldview--already exist. By communicating only with those who already share their perspective, "people are likely to move toward a more extreme point in the direction to which their group's members were already inclined."¹⁰ The group polarization that results is potentially dangerous for democracy and social peace because such in-group communication intensifies, or deepens, rather than bridges gaps with groups holding other views. Twenty-first century information technology, rather than creating a digital global forum in which ideas are debated cross-culturally, enables greater cultural apartheid, with consequent conflict.

When citizens do not share common experiences, dreams, and memories because they can construct and maintain separate worlds of emotion and meaning while sharing the same physical space, the national community dissolves into fragments. In this decentered twenty-first century world, people are no longer as easily gathered into patriotic prides by governmental powers standing guard on the borders of the state. The concepts of nation and state become unstuck as individuals living within these sovereign spaces are free--as never before--to identify with communities of fate elsewhere or nowhere as they pursue survival and meaning in their lives.

Not yet the wholly fictional avatars unleashed in the Metaverse of cyberpunk novels,¹¹ humans today are empowered to believe and to act by the interplay of personal history and imagination in ways unforeseen even a few years ago. As anthropologist Arjun Appadurai suggests in his seminal study on the globalization of culture, "the imagination is now central to all forms of agency, it is itself a social fact, and is the key component of the new global order."¹²

Who we imagine ourselves to be and how we construct significant meaning in our lives is one important definition of culture. But as Anthony Smith reminds us, our cultural identity is formed by historic circumstances; it is not constructed out of whole cloth. We share in a collective cultural identity because we have feelings and values with respect to a sense of continuity, shared memories, and a sense of common destiny.¹³ In this century, people understand their own culture in the context of a broader global society and "the cultural dimension spans what Anthony Gibbons has called the 'out-thereness' and the 'in-hereness' of globalization: the connection between vast systemic transformations and transformations in our most intimate 'worlds' of every day experience."¹⁴ From this *glocal* (global-local) perspective, culture is every bit as important as politics and economics in determining how peacefully life will be lived in the global neighborhood of 2015.

Bats and Owls and the Insane Moon¹⁵

Faced with 7.2 billion individuals choosing how to behave in our global neighborhood, we "need to look

hard and clearly at the monsters inside us and to consider ways and means of 'caging and taming them.'" ¹⁶ For those with a dark view of human nature, the global age is likely to be a balkanized epoch in which terrorists, rogue nations, thugs, and change itself frighten people out of necessity or cultural preference into ghettoized or gated communities. Furthermore, "population growth and resource scarcities place heavy burdens on many developing countries, and migration becomes a major source of interstate tension." ¹⁷ When globalization is seen in this light, cultural diversity can only lead to a global clash of civilizations and a domestic multicultural disharmony. As *Global Trends 2015* predicts, "Using opportunities afforded by globalization and the opening of civil society, communal groups will be better positioned to mobilize their co-religionists to assert their interests or defend against perceived economic or political discrimination." ¹⁸

Overlaid on this map of fragmenting states rent by cultural disharmony is homogenizing commercial global modernity. Derived initially from American commercial and entertainment culture gushing out of Hollywood, New York, and Main Street, USA, in the twentieth century, this transnational corporate commodification of culture is still perceived by many foreign eyes to be American culture. The science fiction of Neal Stephenson captures this image:

Well, the function of the raft is to bring in more biomass to renew America. Most countries are static; all they need to do is keep having babies. But America's like this big old clanking, smoking machine that just lumbers across the landscape scooping up and eating everything in sight. Leaves a trail of garbage a mile wide. Always needs more fuel....Those people down there give up their children willingly. Send them into the labyrinth by the millions to be eaten up. The industry feeds on them and spits back images, sends out movies and TV programs...images of wealth and exotic things beyond their wildest dreams, back to those people, and it gives them something to dream about, something to aspire to. And that is the function of the raft. It is just a big old krill carrier. ¹⁹

Whether you believe, as some scholars do, that people can only be passive receivers in the face of this powerful transmission from the capitalistic matrix, or you are convinced, as I am, that people are not helpless, that they choose what they consume and that they channel the flow by their personal selection, there is no question that the politics of the ensuing cultural transformation of global society is volatile. ²⁰ Globalization in the form of an expanding commodity culture stimulates a reflexive consciousness about the global system itself. To the extent that the United States is seen to dominate the global system, what is perceived to be American culture becomes the dominant other against which alternative cultures are reflexively defined.

For political scientist Benjamin Barber, the dialectic between consumerist capitalism and tradition is Jihad versus McWorld. "McWorld is a product of popular culture driven by expansionist commerce. Its template is American, its form style....It is about culture as commodity, apparel as ideology." ²¹ *Jihad* is the ultimate reaction to the "numbing and neutering uniformities...of the colonizing culture of McWorld." ²² It begins as self-determination, a search for particular identity that may be a religious struggle on behalf of faith. It is, Barber tells us, the dark side of diversity. Violence is not the inevitable outcome in this culturally diverse world, but the politization of culture is.

Policy Options: Disengagement, Defense, or Dialogue

A hundred years ago, the transformation of economics, politics, and culture caused by industrialization and the subsequent massive human migrations were as destabilizing as today's globalization. Scholars at the time believed that the nationalism so dominant in the nineteenth century was waning. They had confidence that scientific methods, finance, and industrial organization would rationalize and organize a new modern society and replace primordial cultures with communities of reason. Sitting in the year 2001, we look back at the twentieth century with the full realization that modernity did not eliminate cultural difference, that ethno-nationalism is not a relic of the past, and that the state has not withered away. Twentieth-century modern society was both more homogenous and more diversified than that which preceded it. States proliferated. A century of great wars, small wars, and continuing conflict resulted. Paradoxically, the last century closed with both greater democratization and more violent nationalist conflict in the post-Cold War 1990s.

On the basis of this history, I believe it would be foolish arrogance to imagine that the globalization, democratization, and universalism of this century will erase cultural difference and usher in an age of peace. People across the planet are not equally blessed with the benefits of the global age, and they know it. There is significant material inequality within and among states. The deprived and the dispossessed may well strike back for economic reasons alone, and there are few better arguments for ethnonationalism than economic ones, but as Isaiah Berlin once wrote, "to [also] be the object of contempt or patronizing tolerance on the part of proud neighbors is one of the most traumatic experiences that individuals or societies can suffer."²³ They respond, writes Berlin, "like the bent twig of poet Schiller's theory lashing back and refusing to accept their alleged inferiority."²⁴

The U.S. government seems well aware of the danger of the bent twig. In preparing for the threats to American security in 2015, the government worries not about other armies but about terrorists, rogue nations and thugs. As it imagines future threat scenarios, it considers investing in a ballistic missile shield and stronger homeland defenses against biological, chemical, and cyber terrorism. It protects its embassies abroad by increased security, greater setbacks from busy streets, and increased intelligence gathering. It uses its law enforcement forces and its courts to track down, capture, indict, and punish foreigners who would strike Americans and their representatives in Kenya or Saudi Arabia or Yemen as well as in New York. It does all this responsibly because the United States cannot geographically separate itself and its interests from the hostile other. However obscure and asymmetric the threat, the potential for violence is real and it is everywhere.

In the twenty-first century, however, the limits on the use of American military power in achieving our national interests are evident. A strong defense will not mitigate environmental degradation; eliminate the resource scarcities--particularly that of fresh water, brought on by massive population growth--secure human rights; or prevent ethnic or religious conflict. Military power will not end the scourge of AIDS, poverty, global warming, desertification, and the human migrations that result. The world order we seek requires changes in human behavior, and to get there we need a willingness to work together cooperatively to solve the problems we humans have created. Cultural dialogue is the necessary condition. "Recognition of the authenticity of the other, whose views and ideas one is prepared to listen to and debate, as a mutual process--is the only alternative to violence in the many areas of the social order where disengagement is no longer a feasible option."²⁵

I know that practitioners of realist politics ridicule the idea of culture as power, but they are wrong. As historian Akira Iriye contends in his excellent study of cultural internationalism, "If power alone cannot maintain order, culture must assume an increasing measure of responsibility."²⁶ I do not accept the multiculturalist prescription for getting along by going along in which recognition of difference ironically breeds indifference. I embrace the older liberal idea that since we share a common humanity, we should care about one another. And I am persuaded that in global terms we live, as Ulrich Beck argues, in a single "risk society." Chasing after the goods created by modern industrial society, we are inevitably bound together by the "bads" it also generates. Since the behavior of any group of us can imperil all of us and the planet we share, the "public good" is now subject to global debate.²⁷

The hope that by working toward mutual understanding, tolerance, and sympathy we can cultivate a more peaceful world is as deeply embedded in the American tradition as is commitment to a strong defense. In this global age when the foreign permeates the domestic, foreign entanglements cannot be avoided as George Washington might have wished. Isolation is not an option for the United States in the twenty-first century. Nonetheless, by focusing most government attention and resources on shields, setbacks, and the ability to act unilaterally if it needs to, the United States feeds the insecurity of others and creates the impression that disengagement is its chosen strategy for securing American interests in the world.

It would be just as American, and more likely to lead to security, if Americans worked harder at creating trust through engagement with the world. A willingness to search for commonality through well-funded cultural diplomacy is the bedrock to building shared understanding among extremely diverse people. There can be no effective public diplomacy on specific policy issues without it. It will take work to get beyond the scary surface of the foreign and the illusory cultural awareness of the cosmopolitan elite. Americans need to fund, support, and embark on genuine voyages of discovery beyond the cultural boundaries of

neighboring landscapes of meaning through the exchange of ideas, arts, and persons, through scholarly cooperation and the facilitation of cross-cultural understanding. It is also important that they be seen to be doing so bilaterally from our embassies abroad, at home where our national conversation would be informed, and globally in the forum the world has designated for that encounter--UNESCO.

If we Americans work hard enough to get beyond the politics of identity to understand what other cultures truly value, we might find common ground and together, in the words of Amartya Sen, "cultivate the moral imagination needed to face the bats and owls and the insane moon" of this global age.²⁸ In the process of working globally, we Americans might remember as well that the struggle for social justice is central to our own moral identity as a people and renew our efforts to "achieve our country."²⁹

American cultural internationalism--first financed by the great private philanthropic foundations--was an idea born nearly a hundred years ago in our own progressive era. Like many progressive ideas, it was a political response to the social upheaval caused by industrialization across the globe. It was pursued for decades by the American private sector before the United States government embraced it as diplomatic policy in 1938, when European fascism began making inroads in the Western Hemisphere.³⁰ We are now in another tumultuous round of global reconfiguration--this time brought on by globalization. Extending a hand across the cultural boundaries that prevent us from understanding our common humanity and shared fate on a single planet seems to me a very pragmatic, very American way to enter the global age. I hope, this time, the U.S. government will not wait to join in the dialogue until fascism is knocking at our door.

Released: July 23, 2001

iMP Magazine: http://www.cisp.org/imp/july_2001/07_01oglesby.htm

(c) 2001. Donna Oglesby. All rights reserved.

Endnotes

1. All of the 2015 data projections are derived from *Global Trends 2015: A Dialogue About the Future with Nongovernment Experts*, the National Intelligence Council, December 2000.
2. Ginger Thompson, "Migrant Exodus Bleeding Mexico's Heartland," *The New York Times*, June 17, 2001, p. A1.
3. Shaila K. Dewan, "Holy Men (and a Cow) Consecrate Hindu Temple," *The New York Times*, May 28, 2001.
4. Dean E. Murphy, "Two Unlikely Allies Come Together in Hatred of Muslims," *The New York Times*, June 2, 2001, p. A13.
5. "The Cultural Globalization Study" conducted by the Institute of Advanced Study in Culture of the University of Virginia quoted by Zygmunt Bauman in *Community: Seeking Safety in an Insecure World*, (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2001), p. 55.
6. Zygmunt Bauman offers an excellent discussion of cosmopolitans in his book *Community: Seeking Safety in an Insecure World*.
7. Richard Sennett as quoted by Bauman, *Community*, p. 111.
8. Called "print capitalism" by Benedict Anderson in his influential *Imagined Communities* (London: Verso, 1991).
9. Walter Lippmann, *Public Opinion* (New York: Free Press, 1997 [1922]), p. 55.
10. Cass Sunstein, *Republic.com* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), p. 65.
11. Neal Stephenson, *Snow Crash* (New York: Bantam, 1992).
12. Arjun Appadurai, *Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization* (Minneapolis: University of

Minnesota Press, 1996), p. 31.

13. Anthony D. Smith, "Towards a Global Culture," in David Held and Anthony McGrew, *The Global Transformations Reader* (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2000), p. 241.

14. As quoted by John Tomlinson, *Globalization and Culture* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), p. 20.

15. W.B. Yeats's comment on Nietzsche's worldview as quoted by Amartya Sen, "East and West: The Reach of Reason," *New York Review of Books*, July 20, 2000, p. 33.

16. Jonathan Glover, *Humanity: A Moral History of the Twentieth Century* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), as quoted by Sen in "East and West," p. 33.

17. *Global Trends 2015*, p. 83.

18. Ibid. p. 41.

19. Stephenson, *Snow Crash*, p. 110.

20. Russ Neuman makes the media effects argument convincingly in his book *The Future of Mass Audience* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991).

21. Benjamin R. Barber, *Jihad vs. McWorld* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1995), p. 11.

22. Ibid. p. 9.

23. Isaiah Berlin, "The Bent Twig: A Note on Nationalism," *Foreign Affairs*, 51 (1972): 17.

24. Ibid. p. 18.

25. Anthony Giddens, "Living in a Post-Traditional Society," in Ulrich Beck, Anthony Giddens, and Scott Lash, *Reflexive Modernization* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994), p. 106.

26. Akira Iriye, *Cultural Internationalism and World Order*, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), p. 12.

27. The concept of the "risk society" and the "bads" it produces is elaborated by the German sociologist Ulrich Beck in his many books, including *What Is Globalization?* (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2000).

28. Sen, "East and West," p. 38.

29. Richard Rorty, *Achieving Our Country* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998).

30. In 1938, the Department of State established its first division of cultural relations, directed by Ben M. Cherrington, who earlier had been active in the YMCA, according to Iriye, *Cultural Internationalism*, p. 112.

[Back to Top](#)

[CONTINUE TO PART TWO](#)

[CONTINUE TO PART THREE](#)

[Virtual Diplomacy Initiative Homepage](#) | [About the Initiative](#) | [What's New](#) | [Activities](#) | [Grants Publications](#) | [Electronic Discussion Group](#) | [Contact Virtual Diplomacy](#)

[Institute Home](#) | [Education & Training](#) | [Grants & Fellowships](#) | [Policy Research](#) | [Library & Links](#)
[Publications](#) | [News & Media](#) | [About Us](#) | [Events](#) | [Resources](#) | [Jobs](#) | [Contact Us](#)
[Site Map](#)

United States Institute of Peace -- 1200 17th Street NW -- Washington, DC 20036
(202) 457-1700 (phone) -- (202) 429-6063 (fax)
[Send Feedback](#)